Incident directory

2005 - Harrow Court

02/02/2005

Country:

UK

  • Building Fires

Severity:

Fatal

Description

Date of event

2nd February 2005                 

Time of event

02:58 HRS (INITIAL CALL)

Name of premises

Harrow Court (flat 85).

Location

Silam Road, Stevenage, Hertfordshire

Service area

Hertfordshire FRS (HFRS).

Nature of incident

Fire

Property type

High rise building of 18 storeys

Synopsis

Brief Synopsis

Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service (HFRS) were called to a fire on the 15th floor of Harrow Court. There was initially a 2 pump attendance sent. On arrival fire crews made their way up via the escalators with ltd kit to complete the tasks required. The riser outlets were locked with padlocks and chains. Crews then ascertained shortly after arrival to the upper floors that the fire was in fact on the 14th floor, where they made entry into flat 85 without water to rescue occupants that they could hear screaming within. One male occupant was rescued alive (HFRS, circa 2005 & FBU circa 2005).

On re-entry into the flat without a water supply the firefighters attempted to rescue the second occupant, a female, who was within the bedroom that the fire had started within. A rapid fire development (wind driven fire and/or blow torch effect was described) occurred involving initially the bedroom and hallway, then the surrounding areas of the flat and lobby areas. It is understood, this rapid fire development occurred due to a combination of the bedroom window failing and the flat being opened up. A fire-fighter also became entangled in fallen cabling. 2 fire-fighters and the female occupant they were trying to rescue died at the incident (HFRS, circa 2005 & FBU circa 2005).

Photo 1

Images courtesy of The Fire Brigades Union & Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service.

Photo 2

Images courtesy of The Fire Brigades Union & Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service.

Photo 3

Images courtesy of The Fire Brigades Union & Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service.

Photo 4

Images courtesy of The Fire Brigades Union & Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service.

Photo 5

Images courtesy of The Fire Brigades Union & Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service.

Photo 6

Images courtesy of The Fire Brigades Union & Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service.

Photo 7

Flat 85 Lounge.  Images courtesy of The Fire Brigades Union & Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service.

Photo 8

Looking into flat 85 from hallway.  Images courtesy of The Fire Brigades Union & Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service.

Photo 9

Harrow Court.  Images courtesy of The Fire Brigades Union & Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service.

Photo 10

Images courtesy of The Fire Brigades Union & Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service.

Main findings, key lessons & areas for learning

Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service summary of recommendations

Taken from: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service (HFRS). (Circa 2005). Investigation into the deaths of Firefighter Jeffrey Wornham, Firefighter Michael Miller and Ms Natalie Close at 85 Harrow Court, Silam Road, Stevenage, Hertfordshire on Wednesday 2nd February 2005, call number 1693. 

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5 Recommendations Arising From The Investigations

5.1  Local Recommendations

Fire Safety

1.  The Service should review their policy of inspections for high rise buildings to assess the need to have relevant information available to crews.

2.  Stevenage Borough Council (SBC) should explore the feasibility of extending the riser outlets through the fire resisting partition and into the lift lobby at all floor levels in line with modern day standards.

3.  Taking into account recommendation 2 above and the dangers to members of the public or fire crews whilst travelling in the lift, together with the Strathclyde Incident and added complications of controlling the fire resisting qualities of both internal and flat entrance doors (particularly those which are privately owned), SBC should explore the options available to them to secure the integrity of both staircases.

4.  A fire resisting lobby at ground floor level should be formed between all risk rooms and the main staircase to protect its integrity in the event of fire.

5.  The Automatic Opening Vents (AOVs) manual override facility sited in the lobby should be indicated and/or numbered in consultation with HFRS Fire Safety dept.  

6.  All Flat main entrance doors, and internal doors whether privately owned or Local Authority, should be maintained fire resisting and self closing as stipulated in both CP 3 and our letters of 1964, 1976, 1979, 2004 and the current regulations.

7.  A regular inspection programme should be set up by SBC to ensure all fire precautions in common parts of the building are maintained as operating efficiently and effectively. Close partnership, cooperation and communication between LA, EHO’s and HFRS is needed.

8.  HFRS strongly recommend that the fire alarm system, together with the evacuation procedures is looked at in consultation with our fire safety dept, to establish a system which is more appropriate for the building and occupancy. Consideration should be given to the removal of sounders and break glass points in common areas.

9.  SBC should ensure that all fire protection measures are regularly and correctly inspected, tested and maintained with the results recorded in a log book.

10.  The Fire and Rescue Service should consider the need to carry out a specialist risk based inspection of all high rise buildings to highlight any shortfalls in fire safety measures and provide advice to owners & fire crews.

11.  All personnel need to be fully conversant with the procedures to be used when attending high rise incidents. The Service should ensure that crew familiarisation is provided at all levels to ensure that competency and knowledge is maintained.

Operational Procedures

1.  The crew familiarisation inspection programme should be widened to ensure that all high rise properties over eight floors (Generic Risk Assessment 3.2) are included and neighbouring stations also participate in those familiarisation inspections.

2.  Consideration should be given to a system of guidance plates, attached to high rise properties, which would give personnel information about the affected premises. The information should note such things as the chaining shut of the valves, the number of hose lengths to get to the furthest point of the floor and equipment required. Additional points such as the ventilation systems in use and how to manually operate them should be included.

3.  A section within the Hertfordshire High Rise Procedure should be included as Strathclyde have done for “worst case scenarios”, such as actions to be taken resulting from the failure of communications, lifts or risers.

4.  The HFRS “Inner cordon procedure” which basically controls the number of personnel operating inside of it is too complex for this type of incident. The police could control an alternative safety zone and consideration should be given to the delegation of this task within agreed protocols between the two services.

5.  An auditing process should be introduced in order to confirm that personnel have received, read and understood any procedural documents issued. The process should be clearly linked into the service training programme and its prioritisation and delivery of training.

6.  The Service already provide extensive leadership training but existing provision should be reviewed to ensure that officers and particularly those that are exposed to command of risk critical situations are equipped with the skills and knowledge to ensure that they can take effective command of operational incidents. The training should emphasise the need for clear communications and effective delegation with clear briefings.

7.  The Service should reinforce training to all Officers to enhance the levels and understanding relating to dynamic risk assessment procedures. The training should emphasise the need for effective control measures to be in place as crews operate in risk areas.

8.  A programme should be commenced that ensures that crews are complying with the operational procedures that they are required to implement which will ensure that a safe system of work is in place. Particular emphasis should be placed on the use of Bridgeheads, Sectorisation and Safety Zones in general.

9.  A review of how our operational procedures are reviewed should be carried out to ensure that the Service has included the necessary safe systems of work guidance. This should include the necessary training on the guidance provided.

10.  A system of monitoring must be implemented at station level to ensure that the essential task of checking BA sets and its ancillary equipment is carried out and recorded at each change of watch.

11.  A review of the communications used in the risk areas for all types of incidents should be undertaken and re-familiarisation provided so that all personnel are aware of the different radio channels, their specific use and the importance of effective communications whilst wearing BA. 

12.  The importance of correct radio procedures, particularly when used in conjunction with breathing apparatus cannot be over-stressed. The service must ensure that all operational crews are aware that the radio procedure detailed in OPS 2/068 must be adhered to.

13.  A training strategy for improving radio communications should be provided across the Service to enhance the level of knowledge regarding effective radio communications.

14.  At each change of watch the Officer in Charge nominates a specific duty to each crew member. This process should be extended to ensure that teams are formed using their skills and experience in a balanced and operationally effective manner.

15.  The Service should carry out a review of breathing apparatus training, both at its central training establishment and at station level with particular emphasis on the supporting functions of testing, donning the set, BA Control Procedures and the wearing of Personal Protective Equipment whilst working in a risk area. Emphasis must be placed on ensuring that crews are fully aware of the correct technical procedures to be followed whenever BA is deployed.

16.  The Service already provides fire behaviour and ventilation training but the course content should be reviewed to ensure that all operational personnel are aware of the conditions relating to flashover, backdraught and fire gas ignition.

17.  The CD Rom relating to fire behaviour is five years old and should be reviewed for accuracy and consistency with the Service Information System procedure.

18.  The Safe Egress from Buildings Procedure was issued in 1982 and should be reviewed in line with the SIS review process.

19.  OPS 1/023 should be reviewed in order to reflect the new 2004 legislation and clarify what is meant by High Rise in relation to office or residential property.  

19.  The use of mobile phones to Fire Control should be reviewed to verify its effectiveness.

20.  The document “Crewing and Mobilising of Appliances” makes reference to “acting up”. There is different terminology used in other procedures, such as the “Approved to Ride Assessment” and “Temporary Promotion”.  All three documents should be reviewed to ensure consistent terminology is used to avoid confusion.  

21.  The discrepancy in timings between the Vision and Dictaphone systems must be corrected to ensure a clear record of all calls and actions taken is available.

22.  All Officers should be reminded that they must inform Command & Control when they take over command of an incident.

Equipment and PPE

1.  The PPE ‘no rigging en route’ policy should be constantly reiterated and enforced by Officers in Charge of appliances with action taken against those personnel who are not adhering to the correct procedure.

2.  The risks associated with incorrect rigging need to be promoted and BA wearers should be reminded that it is good practice to check their BA partner is correctly rigged before entry to the risk area.

3.  Icom radios should be reviewed to ensure that they are fit for purpose as the ingress of water and deterioration of the circuit board is a fault known to the manufacturers.

4.  An Asset Management System should be introduced in order to establish a ‘whole life’ audit trail of all equipment used by the Service. The system should include facilities to enable equipment to be marked, tracked and logged. At the present time this is not carried out.

5.  At change-of-Watch, nominated BA wearers are required to undertake general checks on their BA sets and ancillary equipment which includes testing the operation of the ADSU. This testing twice a day is recorded in the BA log book. This practice should be rigorously enforced.

6.  The procedure for BA Control with one appliance in attendance and no BAECO available is known as ‘Initial Deployment’. The wording on the ECB states ‘Rapid Deployment’. Replacement boards purchased in future should have the correct wording to avoid confusion and reinforce the message that Initial Deployment is only the first stage of BA Control.

7.  All new equipment should be made the subject of a full and thorough risk assessment before being used on front line appliances. The ‘field trial’ process should be tightened up to ensure that equipment issued on a short term basis is subject to all the control measures in place for equipment that has been through the complete procurement process.

8.  Tech 1/019 (Bolt Croppers) should be reviewed. It contains a lot of highly technical information, which is of no consequence to the operational Firefighter. It would be more helpful if it contained instructions for use, such as the correct chain link cutting technique.

9.  Service personnel should be reminded of the benefits and when to use Thermal Image Cameras at incidents. Incident Commanders must consider the size of BA teams when deciding if a TIC is to be deployed.

10.  Managers on station should ensure that only equipment provided by the Service is carried on appliances. This ensures that the equipment has been through the appropriate selection and assessment process carried out by the Technical Services Department.

11.  Pump Operators should be made aware that when a dry rising main is utilised to fight a serious fire, the water supply should be supplemented from a hydrant as a matter of urgency. The supply from a hydrant to a riser, via a pump should be fed through twin lines of hose.

12.  TECH 2/058 states that the audio output for the Automatic Distress Signal Unit ‘OK’ and pre-alarm is tested at 3 metres, whereas the distance for full alarm is 2 metres. JCDD 38 states that the distance is 2 metres for all three. TECH 2/058 should be reviewed and the correct figures inserted.

Supervision and Command

1.  The ICS Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) approach should be part of the Service overall system for managing risk. The DRA approach should therefore be linked into the Service Health and Safety Policy.

2.  TC 2/035, which is used to form the syllabus for delivering ICS to the service, should be deleted and the revised Op’s Procedure 1/020 should be used in its place. Alternatively, TC 2/035 must be fully updated in line with the above and must include reference to Risk Assessment.

3.  The Service should develop a robust system of performance management and review to fully comply with Reg. 5 (1) of the ‘Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 which states, ‘every employer shall make effective arrangements for planning, organisational control, monitoring and review of the preventative & protective measures’. In particular there should be an audit to ensure that safe systems of work that are included in the operational procedures are implemented.

4.  The use of Integrated Personal Development System (IPDS) and the current National Occupational Standards (NOS) should be integrated into officer ICS training programmes to ensure the training provided is fully matched to the role.  

5.  As part of the IPDS process individual operational performance should be tested, measured and recorded to ensure personnel are fully prepared and remain competent for their respective role. The standards required should be developed and introduced across the service as soon as possible.

6.  Officers with operational responsibility should be subjected to and tested on ICS to ensure that they have the correct knowledge and skills to implement the safe system of work required.

7.  A comprehensive Command Support Pack which includes documentation for recording and updating risk assessments and the closing and handing over of operations should be developed and sited to be readily available for use both in the early stages of an incident, or on occasions when the Command Support Unit may be unavailable. This is as recommended in the Fire Service Manual Volume 2.

8.  SIS document OPS 1/020 should be reviewed to summarise and specify the generic ICS actions to be taken during the early stages of an incident including:

  • On arrival at incident, crews must not ‘self deploy’ but must be kept together until fully briefed
  • Effective briefing of crews following Dynamic Risk Assessment which may start on route to the incident, should  include individual and team goals, the allocation of  responsibilities and the safety measures and procedures to be  implemented
  • Correct and effective delegation and use of radio communications, including allocation of channels.
  • Where there is any doubt as to the control measures to be put in place the need to default to ‘Defensive’ mode.
  • Senior Officers must make it clear when they are assuming command and relay this message to Control.

9.  Initial training and development should be carried out using operational scenarios with a variety of training aids and methods including:

  • Knowledge & understanding (including operational procedures)
  • Realistic training scenarios
  • Exposure to incidents and debriefs commanded by others
  • Table top exercise
  • Role play
  • Case study
  • Vector training

10.  In view of the use of the Incident Command Board at this incident, research should be instigated to determine the appropriateness of the current design and associated procedure.

Training

1.  An effective method of document control should be introduced within HFRS to ensure that any changes at a national level in legislation or procedures are introduced to Service policy including training as soon as possible.

2.  An auditing system should be introduced to ensure that employees have received the appropriate information, instruction and training whenever a change is made to national legislation. The auditing system should ensure that all personnel understand the information received and act upon it.

3.  The responsibility for effective training provision should be emphasised to all managers and overall responsibility placed in one central and identifiable position.

4.  The present system of nominations only being made by watch or station managers for all courses should be changed to a system where all training nominations are made centrally. The central recording system should include station level input to ensure that Station Managers are engaged in the nomination process.

5.  The recording of all training carried out should be incorporated into a central electronic system, which will enable strategic monitoring and the effective provision of training.

6.  The course nomination procedures should be incorporated into a highly visible SIS procedure.

7.  The Service should consider sending Officers or potential Officers to the Fire Service College or similar on core progression courses where they will receive theoretical and practical training in live fire situations and management of crews at operational incidents.

8.  The Service should influence the Fire Service College to introduce new practical command courses for newly promoted officers at all ranks. (A new course for Crew and Watch Managers has been introduced during 2005).

9.  The Service should introduce a robust BA course nomination process to ensure that all operational personnel receive regular training and updates on current BA fire behaviour procedures. They should wear BA in heat and smoke on a regular basis as recommended in Fire Service Circular 17/1970.

10.  Operational activity regarding compartment fire behaviour should be monitored by HFRS and additional training should, if required be provided as a result of the feedback received.

11.  The breathing apparatus guidance (OPS 2/057) should be reviewed to ensure that just one document comprehensively covers flashover, backdraught and the risks associated at BA incidents. The document should include the specific points raised in the generic risk assessments and national guidance.

12.  The obvious discrepancies between the high rise buildings CD ROM and the HFRS operational procedure note should be corrected or withdrawn from the station training package and the presentation deleted from Fire Web.

13.  The BA training provided at the central training department should be reviewed to ensure that it includes all areas of operational activity.

14.  The assessment of trainers should be formalised in accordance with the national guidance, which states, “To remain in certification and provide evidence of proficiency, instructors should be assessed at regular intervals in knowledge, skills and understanding. The assessment process and recording must be managed, preferably by the Brigade Training Officer.”

15.  The use of an alternative firefighting branch during training should cease. The operational branch must be used during CFBT.

16.  OPS 2/058 regarding flashover training should be deleted from the SIS.

17.  Recruit Student Note 2/033 should be reviewed and updated to reflect the information provided in Operational Procedure 3/088.

18.  The Recruit PowerPoint High Rise Presentation should be reviewed and updated to reflect the information provided in Operational Procedure 3/088.

19.  The “principles of air conditioning and building construction” should be incorporated within the basic recruit training.

20.  Pressurised atmospheres and refrigerator plants should be formally incorporated into the recruit BA training syllabus.

21.  The station “role model” system of recording training should be reviewed to check reliability and that it is functioning correctly. Particular emphasis should be placed on the reasons for training gaps at the stations researched.

22.  Watch Officers must ensure that all training is correctly and efficiently delivered and recorded.

23.  A robust auditing system should be introduced to ensure that all station training carried out is accurately recorded and monitored.

24.  Any new recording system introduced should maintain the facility to record specific elements of training in those risk critical subjects such as BA training and its component parts such as heat and smoke and entry procedures.

25.  Training targets within the station system should be reviewed, specified and monitored.

26.  Watch Officers should ensure that all practical experience or NVQ training is correctly recorded in the station training records.

27.  Station Managers should ensure that tasks have been completed through sampling.

5.2 National Recommendations

Fire Safety

1.  Provision should be made to inform all relevant stakeholders including Local Authorities, Housing Associations and other Fire Authorities of the potential dangers associated with the lack of adequate securing of cables in trunking, particularly any which were installed to the 1988 British Standard.

2.  The method and effectiveness of smoke ventilation in the stairways and corridors should be re-assessed in light of the fire and any BRE findings. Consideration should be given to the provision of inlet air at ground floor level.

3.  Consideration should be given to fitting Intumescent strips and smoke seals to all fire resisting doors, including entrance doors to flats, common areas and staircases.

4.  Due to the heightened risk of fire affecting many occupants if naked lights or unsafe appliances are used to supplement any electric heating or lighting in this type of building, SBC should seek alternatives to the ‘Top Up’ system of electricity supply. An example could be to include within the rent.

5.  If Recommendation 4 is not feasible then the domestic smoke detectors should be re-wired into the communal electricity supply to ensure the only need for the battery back up will be when there is a total mains electricity failure.

6.  Any new or replacement smoke detectors installed within the flats in these type of premises should be fitted with a back up power supply such as a capacitor or 10 year battery.

7.  The UK Fire service should explore options for high rise buildings which consider the following:

  • Provision of sprinklers in high rise buildings
  • Removal of Break Glass Points to prevent vandalism and reduce false alarm calls
  • Installation, removal or Zoning of fire alarm in common areas linked to a clear evacuation policy
  • Whether the AFD should be sited in the staircase only and linked to activate AOV’s
  • To consider if fire alarms are to be installed in this type of building, whether it is appropriate and necessary for them to be linked to auto–diallers.

8.  The proposed amendments to Approved Document B (ODPM fire safety guidance to the Building Regulations) which is due to be finalised by the ODPM this year will continue to allow a new building to be constructed without a dedicated fire fighting lobby, albeit with ventilation to lobbies and corridors.  

We recommend that this situation is reviewed by the ODPM in light of the fire situation at Harrow Court.

9.  The following areas are significant and may warrant further investigation and research as they have national implications concerning past legislative requirements.

  • The effect of a non-ventilated protected corridor
  • The effect of a non-ventilated lobby
  • The effect of single door protection to the staircase enclosure
  • The effect of numerous fire doors being open due to hose and fire fighting operations
  • The chimney effect in the main stairs
  • The effect of the AOV’s within the staircase enclosures and their effect on the fire behaviour
  • Whether the specification of the AOV’s was appropriate regarding the outlet and inlet areas
  • The possibility that the AOV’s allowed air into the staircase, due to atmospherics around the building in the early stages

Equipment and PPE

JCDD 38 states that an ADSU should function correctly following a test where it is subjected to a temperature of 75oC for one hour. Given that the battery recommended for this unit cannot be relied upon at temperatures above 55oC, and the PPE provides protection up to 1000oC this area of incompatibility should be explored.

Training

With the current national assessment and promotion procedure there is no test of an individual’s command potential or ability using simulated fireground scenarios, as there used to be in the old Leading Firefighter and Sub Officer Examinations. The Service should consider the impact not testing in command, which is a risk critical skill, has had on the operational competency testing prior to promotion, and to raise this issue with the national policy makers.

Progress continues with all of the recommendations and in particular the follow up actions which include regular auditing, monitoring of standards and improvements in process and systems as new information is returned from the relevant bodies acting on the Information provided to them.

The specific status of each recommendation can be found by visiting www.hertsdirect.org/fire.

Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service welcome a full appraisal by the Health and Safety Executive of the evidence provided to them and the changes it has made since the incident occurred.

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FBU summary of main findings, key lessons & recommendations

Taken from: The Fire Brigades Union (FBU). (circa 2005). Fire Brigades Union Region 9 Health and Safety Investigation at 85 Harrow Court, Silam Road, Stevenage, Hertfordshire. 

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13 Conclusions

As a result of the findings in this report, the FBU believes that:

13.1. HFRS failed to fulfil their statutory duties in accordance with the Fire Services Act 2004, Part 2, Section 7 (2)(a), (b) & (d) in that they failed to secure the provision of the personnel, services and equipment necessary to respond as the initial attendance to the fire at Harrow Court; failed to secure adequate provision of training for the personnel that formed that insufficient initial response to Harrow Court; and failed to make sufficient arrangements to obtain the information needed to protect life and property in the event of a fire.

13.2. HFRS failed to fulfil their duty in accordance with the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, Section 2 (2)(c) in that they failed to provide such information, instruction, training and supervision as is necessary to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety at work of their employees.

13.3. HFRS failed to fulfil their responsibilities in accordance with Regulation 13 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 in that they failed to take account of the capabilities of their employees whilst entrusting tasks to them for which HFRS had not ensured they had been adequately trained and competent to undertake.

13.4. HFRS failed to satisfactorily follow guidance from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate to ensure safe systems of work in respect of Fire Service Manuals:

  • A Guide to Operational Risk Assessment;
  • Volume 2-Fire Service Operations-Compartment Fires and Ventilation;
  • Volume 2-Fire Service Operations-Incident Command;
  • Volume 4-Fire Service Training-Guidance Compliance Framework for
  • Compartment Fire Behaviour Training;
  • Volume 4-Fire Service Training-Fire Service Manual-Training:
  • Technical Bulleting 1/1997-Breathing Apparatus-Command and Control

13.5. HFRS failed to ensure their High Rise Incident Procedures were sufficiently comprehensive in content, adequately resourced or their staff routinely and properly trained in their application. In particular, HFRS failed to take account of recommendations following the HSE Improvement Notice awarded to the Strathclyde Fire Board.

13.6. HFRS failed to fulfil their obligations to the FBU H&S Investigation in accordance with the Safety Representative and Safety Committee Regulations 1977 in that they failed to cooperate and voluntarily give full disclosure, access to documents, provision of information/evidence and obstructed the right to have private discussions with employees whilst at work.

13.7. Stevenage Borough Council (SBC) may have failed to undertake a review of the smoke alarm installations in the individual flats at Harrow Court to assess their appropriateness as recommended in BS 5839-6:2004 annex A 4.1 a & b and 5.1 a, b & c.

13.8. SBC may have failed to ensure their contractor complied with BS 5839-1: 2002;clause 26.2(f) in respect of precluding the use of plastic trunking for securing the electrical cabling of their common area fire alarm system.

13.9. The conduct of Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service significantly contributed to the deaths of Ff Wornham and Ff Miller.

13.10. Stevenage Borough Council (SBC) may have contributed to the deaths of Ff Miller and FF Wornham.

14 Recommendations

Fire Safety

1.  That SBC should undertake a fire risk assessment of all their occupants taking into account their ‘Lifestyles’ to ensure that they have the right kind of smoke detector/s in the right locations as recommended in BS 5839-6:2004 Annex A 5.1 a, b & c.

2.  That SBC should replace the smoke alarms for all their “high risk” tenants such as the elderly, socially deprived, and for any tenants with prepaid electricity meters, to a hard wired smoke alarm with a ‘non removable rechargeable long life battery’, as in these cases a more reliable power supply is essential, as recommended in; BS 5839- 6:2004 Annex A 4.1 a & b.

3.  SBC should also create a robust maintenance and testing regime for all their properties fitted with smoke alarms, and continue to provide instruction on the use of the smoke alarm, how and when to change the batteries and how to ‘prevent false alarms’ to all their tenants, as recommended in both past and present British Standards.

4.  That HFRS offer the residents of all high rise residential buildings the opportunity of having a Home Fire Safety Visit.

5.  That SBC in consultation with HFRS Fire Safety Department should re-evaluate its entire fire safety evacuation strategy for blocks of high rise apartments and in particular the apparent contradiction between the ‘Stay Put’ and ‘evacuation’ strategies, and provide explicit direction in what to do in the event of a fire in a flat, and what to do in the event that it becomes necessary to evacuate another flat/s, and entire floor or even the whole building. Subsequently, it would be necessary to review the fire safety procedure notices ensuring that they give clear instructions to all their tenants, visitors and staff on what to do in the event of a fire in any part of the building.

6.  That HFRS should ensure that all fire fighters receive regular training in all aspects of active fire safety measures in line with Fire Service Manual Volume 3 Fire Safety ‘Fire Protection of buildings,’ to ensure that all fire fighters are aware of the impact, the various active fire safety measures may have on their operational procedures.

7.  HFRS should also ensure that there are sufficient fire fighters on the initial attendance so that one fire fighter can be detailed as forward/sector commander, in line with Fire Service Manual Volume 2 Fire Service Operations ‘Incident Command’, Fire Service Guide Volume 3 ‘A guide to operational assessment risk’ Generic Risk Assessment 3.2 and their own high Rise procedures OPS 3/088.

8.  That SBC should remove all the surface mounted plastic trunking/conduit used to protect and support the Fire Alarm and Automatic Fire Detection System in the Common Areas of all their premises, and replace them with a method of cable support which as a minimum conforms to BS 5839- Part 1 : 2002; clause 26.2 (f:); Methods of cable support should be such that circuit integrity will not be reduced below that afforded by the cable used, and should withstand a similar temperature and duration to that of the cable, while maintaining adequate support. Note 7. In effect, this recommendation precludes the use of plastic cable clips, cable ties or trunking, where these products are the sole means of cable support.

9.  That SBC should upgrade Harrow Court so that it meets the requirements of the Building Regulations, Approved Document B, BS 5588-5:2004, and BS 5588-1:1990, That SBC should carry out a review of the ventilation strategy for the entire building, to ensure that there is a sufficient supply of fresh air to enable the automatic vents to operate effectively, and reinstate the opening devices on at least some if not all the windows in the stair enclosure to provide ‘controlled’ ventilation to the common areas of the building.

10.  That HFRS should ensure that all fire fighters receive regular training in all aspects of compartment fires and ventilation of high rise buildings in line with Fire Service Manual Volume 2 Fire Service Operations ‘Compartment Fires and Tactical Ventilation and ensure that all their fire fighters are up to date with the operation and use of the AOVs manual override/control switches and familiar with their location at all high rise buildings to which they form part of the predetermined attendance.

11.  That SBC in consultation with HFRS should provide a sign/label for the AOV manual override/control switches, so that they can be readily identified as to which vent they operate and provide instructions for their use.

12.  SBC should immediately carry out a survey of the flats in Harrow Court to ensure that all the individual dwelling entrance doors are positively self closing and fire resisting, work correctly and if necessary make any adjustments and repairs without further delay.

13.  SBC should immediately carry out a survey of each flat in Harrow Court to ensure that the integrity of the fire resisting entrance /internal hall has not been compromised, that all the internal self closing fire resisting doors are in place and work correctly, and if necessary make any adjustments and repairs without further delay.

14.  SBC should provide advice for all residents of Harrow Court of the fire safety strategy of their individual flat and the importance of keeping all self closing doors shut particularly at night after they have gone to bed as recommended in Section 8 CP3 : 4 Part 1. 1962 and all subsequent standards.

15.  We are aware that there are proposals contained in the current review being undertaken by the Buildings Division of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG – formerly ODPM) of Approved Document Part B – 2000 – Fire safety relating to the provision of domestic sprinkler systems in high rise residential buildings. We fully support the implementation of this proposal which we believe would have assisted greatly at Harrow Court. The issue of creating a national (England and Wales) fire and rescue service standard operating procedures for fire fighting in high rise residential buildings which aligns with the guidance for the fire safety design strategies in such buildings that is contained in Approved Document Part B and other British Standards needs to be addressed at a national level. This work needs to be carried out urgently.

16.  We are aware that there is a current review being undertaken by the Buildings Division of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG – formerly ODPM) of Approved Document Part B – Fire Safety 2000 (ADB), we believe that in light of the incident at Harrow Court in Stevenage that paragraph 18.12 of Section B5 – Access to Buildings for Fire-fighting Personnel should be withdrawn and in all new high rise apartment buildings in excess of 18m in height the staircase enclosures should be designed and constructed as firefighting shafts and each firefighting shaft should incorporate a firefighting lift and a rising main facility within the firefighting lobby between the staircase and the accommodation.

17.  It is the opinion of the authors that had the design of Harrow Court incorporated two firefighting shafts both of which incorporated a firefighting lift and a dry rising main facility this would have greatly assisted with the fire fighting operations and limited the spread of heat and smoke to other parts of the building. It is also very necessary that the review gives consideration to providing guidance in the ADB replacement document to the venting of smoke from access corridors in apartment buildings which do not have an external wall. We do not believe that this should be achieved by venting via the staircase enclosure.

18.  We are aware that there are proposals contained in the current review being undertaken by the Buildings Division of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG – formerly ODPM) of Approved Document Part B – 2000 – Fire safety relating to improved corridor smoke ventilation systems in high rise residential buildings. We fully support the implementation of this proposal which we believe would have assisted greatly at Harrow Court.

19.  That SBC should immediately carry out a survey of the self closing fire resisting doors through out the common areas of the building to ensure that they are in place, that they work correctly and if necessary make any adjustments and repairs without further delay, furthermore we recommend that all the above mentioned doors should be fitted with intumescent strips and smoke stop seals.

20.  SBC should immediately carry out a strategic review and risk assessment of the fire safety strategy of the building and as part of that process assess the need to;

  • Upgrade the layout of the ground floor foyer, to one that complies with the Approved Document B 2000 – Fire safety; 

and

  • Reinstate open able ventilation windows in the stair enclosures to provide  ventilation to the staircase enclosures in the event of a fire.
  • Move the existing dry riser outlet from the staircase enclosure into corridor

and/or

  • Provide a second dry rising main at the far end of the building.

21.  That SBC whilst carrying out the ‘strategic review and risk assessment of the fire safety strategy of the building’ (recommendation number 21), they should also provide the lift shafts with protection from the ingress of water and smoke in line with BS 5588- Part 5: 2004, Section 13 and Annex A.

22.  We recommend that whilst under taking all of the above recommendations SBC should wherever practicable ensure that there fire safety strategy and fire safety measures meet the appropriate current guidance or standards.

23.  HFRS should ensure that at all fires in High Rise buildings there are sufficient fire fighters on the initial attendance to ensure that one fire fighter can be detailed as lift operator, in line with Fire Service Guide Volume 3 ‘A guide to operational assessment risk’ Generic Risk Assessment 3.2 and their own high Rise procedures OPS 3/088.

24.  HFRS should ensure that all fire fighters receive regular training and monitoring in all aspects of High Rise procedures and ensure that a bridgehead is set up two floors below the fire floor on every occasion, to ensure that fire fighters do not inadvertently open the lift doors directly into a fire situation.

25.  That HFRS amend its Service Information System note OPS 3/088 High Rise Incidents procedures highlighted below, and any other subsequent changes that may be recommended following the conclusion of this investigation.

  • To reflect the fact that some high rise buildings, may use chains to secure their dry riser outlets and that it is necessary for bolt croppers to be taken up to the bridgehead as part of the equipment required by the initial crews.
  • That there are sufficient fire fighters on the initial attendance, to enable a firefighter to be immediately deployed to check that the dry riser outlets are closed and have not been vandalised on all floors prior to charging, this will also assist in identifying which method has been used to secure the dry riser outlets and ensuring that the right equipment is taken up to the bridgehead.

26.  That HFRS should ensure that all their fire fighters receive regular training and monitoring in all aspects of High Rise procedures, and ensure that the initial crews take the correct equipment up to the bridgehead; this could be achieved by the introduction of a High Rise Pack containing all of the equipment recommended in the policy document.

27.  That HFRS need to ensure that all their bolt croppers carried on fire appliances are fit for purpose, sharp enough and regularly maintained to ensure that they can cut through the chains securing the dry riser outlets.

28.  That HFRS should provide additional resources to enable their fire safety department to immediately carry out a risk based inspection programme within the county of Hertfordshire, starting with high rise residential building.

29.  That HFRS should established a formal structure that would allow operational /intervention managers to liaise regularly with the HFRS fire protection managers, so that they can be fully briefed upon any new or existing buildings in which there are facilities provided for the assistance and safety of firefighters. Where necessary any information about a building that might be of assistance to firefighters should also be added to the HFRS Risk Card and placed on the control and command computer, so that it can be passed to any crews mobilised to any incident at such a building.

30.  That HFRS should reintroduce the practice of regular inspections of all high rise building under section 1(1)(d) of the Fire Service Act 1947 and complete HFRS 35 Risk Card which should be carried on all appliances. This process is an ideal method for fire fighters to familiarise themselves with the risks associated with any particular building and is recommended by;

  • The ODPM’s own IRMP Guidance Note 4 recognises the importance of 1(1)(d) visits as a way “to gather operation intelligence,”
  • Fire Service Guide Volume 3 ‘A guide to operational assessment risk’ Generic Risk Assessment 3.2 also recommends the use of 1(1)(d) inspections on High Rise building.
  • HFRS’s own High Rise Incidents service information note OPS 3/088 states that 1(1)(d) inspections should be carried out as a means of pre planning.
  • That the testing of dry riser mains should form part of any risk based inspection and,
  • That HFRS should cease its policy of charging for the testing of dry riser mains and encourage all landlords/owns of high rise building to have their dry riser mains tested.

31.  That HFRS actively enforce Article 38 of the Fire Safety Order (when implemented) to ensure that the passive and active fire safety measures incorporate into the building for the protection of fire fighters are present and effectively maintained

Personal Protective Equipment

1.  That HFRS should commission a full scientific analysis including the appropriate EN and ISO tests are carried out on a number of different samples of complete sets of firefighting PPE to establish whether it confirms to the relevant EN Standards and that the PPE is fit for purpose.

2.  That BSI and CEN should review the entire specifications for ‘protective clothing for fighters’ in the light of the estimated temperatures that are believed to have occurred and the duration that Ff Wornham was in the risk area.

3.  Until the results of these further tests are known, as an additional control measure HFRS should immediately revise its ‘stand alone’ strategy on the wearing of clothes under the fire kit.

4.  The HFRS IRMP should be revised to ensure that the services intervention capability is sufficiently robust to ensure that the weight and speed of response delivers sufficient firefighters on the initial attendance to ensure that a BAECO will be established on every occasion that BA is used.

5.  That HFRS should bring the services ‘rigging on route’ policy to the attention of all operational personnel, and instruct Crew & Watch managers to ensure that all personnel comply with the services policy on all occasions.

Equipment

1.  That BSI, CEN and JCDD should review the standards and specifications for all ADSU units in the light that the batteries recommended by the manufacture cannot be relied upon at temperature above 55oC and that firefighters are required to work in temperatures far exceeding that, in the case of Harrow court the estimated maximum temperature ranged was between 800 and 900oC.

2.  That HFRS should review its decision to provide ICOM radios to BA wearers as they are ‘not intrinsically safe,’ there is also have a problem with the ingress of water and the corrosion of the printed circuit boards, which may have accounted for the poor and intermittent reception during this particular incident, a fault which the manufactures are aware.

3.  That HFRS should ensure that the new integral breathing apparatus communication equipment is readily available and working, on all its front line pumping appliances.

4.  That HFRS should immediately review SIS TECH 2/058 as it refers to the Motorola GP900 and the PRP 74 as the handheld radios used by the service.

5.  That HFRS introduce of a managed track and trace system for all items operation equipment.

6.  That HFRS instruct all Watch / Station manages to rigorously monitor the daily BA checks and ensure that all BA log book are completed accordingly.

Water Supply and Equipment

1.  That HFRS immediately commission an in-depth detailed examination into the suitability of using the Delta H 500 65f for compartment firefighting in high rise buildings.

2.  That HFRS should immediately revise its High Rise Incidents procedures taking into account the final outcomes from this particular investigation, the equipment required to be taken up to the bridgehead and particular attention should be made to the guidance given with regard to water pressures, flow rates and tactical firefighting .

HFRS High Rise Incident Procedures

1.  That DCLG should immediately revise the ‘High Rise Incidents’ Generic Risk Assessment GRA 3.2 taking into account the final outcomes from this particular investigation, and that of the Petershill Court, Glasgow fire which resulted in Strathclyde FRS receiving an improvement notice dated 29th March 2003, together with the recommendations contained in the following documents;

  • BDAG research report, Aspects of High Rise Firefighting (Fire Research

Technical Report 3/2005 published in December 2004)

  • Fire Service Circular (FSC) 55-2004,
  • HSE Improvement Notice F210003173
  • CAST 1, FDR1 Fires: Dwellings; Multiple Occupancy High Rise, 2 to 4 casualties involved rescue via internal staircase.

2.  That HFRS should immediately revise its High Rise Incidents procedures taking into account the final outcomes from this particular investigation, and that of the Petershill Court, Glasgow fire which resulted in Strathclyde FRS receiving an improvement notice on the 29th March 2003, together with the recommendations contained in the following documents;

  • BDAG research report, Aspects of High Rise Firefighting (Fire Research Technical Report 3/2005 published in December 2004)
  • Fire Service Circular (FSC) 55-2004,
  • HSE Improvement Notice F210003173
  • CAST 1, FDR1 Fires: Dwellings; Multiple Occupancy High Rise, 2 to 4 casualties involved rescue via internal staircase.

3.  The policy should also contain detail on, or ‘make reference to’ where the reader can find the following information;

  • Tactical Ventilation
  • Compartment Fires
  • Fire phenomena’s such as Backdraught, Flashover and the previously mentioned ‘Blowtorch’
  • Fire protection arrangements found in these types of buildings.

4.  That HFRS would then have to prepare a new training programme, ensuring that it meets the requirements of the revised documents and make certain that all personnel receive centrally delivered practical and theoretical training in the new procedures as soon as reasonably practical.

That HFRS should reintroduce the practice of regular inspections of all high rise building under section 1(1)(d) of the Fire Service Act 1947 and complete HFRS 35 Risk Card which should be carried on all appliances and the services mobilising computer system. This process is an ideal method for fire fighters to familiarise themselves with the risks associated with any particular building and is recommended by;

  • The ODPM’s own IRMP Guidance Note 4 recognises the importance of 1(1)(d) visits as a way “to gather operation intelligence,”
  • Fire Service Guide Volume 3 ‘A guide to operational assessment risk’ Generic Risk Assessment 3.2 also recommends the use of 1(1)(d) inspections on High Rise building.
  • HFRS’s own High Rise Incidents SIS note OPS 3/088 states that 1(1)(d) inspections should be carried out as a means of pre planning.

1.  This would also require a revision of the HFRS Inspection under Section 1(i)(d) of the Fire Services Act , SIS note OPS1/023.

2.  The HFRS IRMP should be revised to ensure that the services intervention capability is sufficiently robust enough to ensure that the weight and speed of response, delivers sufficient firefighters and operational equipment on the initial attendance to enable their High Rise procedures to be implemented in full from the very start of every incident.

HFRS Breathing Apparatus (BA) Procedures

1.  We are aware that there is a review currently taking place of TB 1/97 by the Buildings Division of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG– formerly the ODPM). We believe that this should include any recommendations that may arise from both the Bethnal Green fatal fire and this particular Harrow Court investigation, together with any recommendations that arise from the following documents.

  • BDAG research report, Aspects of High Rise Firefighting (Fire Research Technical Report 3/2005 published in December 2004) in particular Section 3 Compartment firefighting, training and tactics.
  • Fire Service Circular (FSC) 55-2004 in particular the recommendations in section 5.4.

That HFRS should immediately revise its Breathing Apparatus procedures and bring them back into line with TB 1/97. This review will also need to take account of any recommendations that may arise from both the Bethnal Green fatal fire and this particular Harrow Court investigation, together with any recommendations that may arise from the following documents.

  • The revised TB 1/97
  • Any future revisions to the national ‘Guides to Operational Risk Assessment’ (GRA)

2.  That HFRS would then have to prepare a new training programme, ensuring that it meets the requirements of the revised documents referred to above and ensure that all operational personnel receive centrally delivered practical, theoretical and refresher training on BA procedures as soon as reasonably practical.

3.  The HFRS IRMP should be revised to ensure that the services intervention capability is sufficiently robust to ensure that the weight and speed of response delivers sufficient firefighters and operational equipment on the initial attendance to enable their Breathing Apparatus procedures to be implemented in full from the very start of every incident.

HFRS Incident Command System (ICS) Procedures

1.  That HFRS should immediately revise its Incident Command System and ensure that it corresponds with the Fire Service Manual Volume.  Fire Service Operations- Incident Command. This review will also need to take account of any recommendations that may have arisen from both the Bethnal Green fatal fire, and Petershill Court, Glasgow fire and this particular Harrow Court investigation.

2.  That HFRS would then have to prepare a new training programme, ensuring that it meets the requirements of the revised Incident Command System referred to above and ensure that all operational personnel and supervisory officers receive regular centrally delivered practical, theoretical and refresher training on as soon as reasonably practical.

3.  That HFRS would also have to prepare a new Dynamic Risk Assessment training programme, ensuring that it meets the requirements of the revised Incident Command System and ensure that all operational personnel and supervisory officers receive regular centrally delivered practical, theoretical and refresher training on as soon as reasonably practical.

4.  That HFRS would also have to prepare a new training programme on Radio Procedures and Messages, ensuring all operational personnel and supervisory officers receive regular centrally delivered practical, theoretical and refresher training on as soon as reasonably practical.

5.  The HFRS IRMP should be revised to ensure that the services intervention capability is sufficiently robust to ensure that the weight and speed of response delivers sufficient firefighters and operational equipment on the initial attendance to enable their Incident Command System procedures to be implemented in full from the very start of every incident.

6.  That HFRS should purchase sufficient incident command surcoats to ensure each major pumping appliance carry a complete ‘Command Team’ set comprises of:

  • Incident Commander
  • Command Support
  • Sector Commanders
  • Safety Officer
  • Operational Commander
  • Inner Cordon Control Officer

Training

1.  That HFRS immediately initiate a comprehensive Training Needs Analysis in (accordance with the HMI Fire Service Manual-Volume 4-Fire Service Manual – Training, Section 2.3) for all firefighting staff with a view to developing a comprehensive and properly resourced training programme incorporating delivery at both the central training centre and at stations.

2.  That HFRS review and properly resource comprehensive Compartment Fire Behaviour Training (CFBT) for all RDS and Wholetime Firefighters such that it shall include practical fire-attack training.

3.  That HFRS review and properly resource BA training such that it shall be a separate course from the properly dedicated CFBT course (consistent with the Fire Service Manual Volume 4: Guidance and Compliance for Framework Compartment Fire Behaviour Training: “Training in Compartment Fire Behaviour and Compartment Firefighting should not be confused with other Breathing Apparatus heat and smoke training which has different aims and objectives associated with acquiring the skills necessary to wear Breathing Apparatus”).

4.  That HFRS review and properly resource Breathing Apparatus procedures and training consistent with HMI technical bulletin 1/97.

5.  That HFRS review and properly resource joined-up, theoretical and practical High Rise Incident training consistent with revised standard operating procedures in the light of the Harrow Court incident and the recommendations following the HSE Improvement Notice awarded to the Strathclyde Fire Board.

6.  That HFRS reintroduce the systematic, frequent inspection of High Rise premises in their territory and ensure a programme of systematic regular familiarisation training for fire crews local to those premises. That HFRS review Incident Command procedures to ensure that they are fit for purpose; ensure the necessary competencies of Initial Incident Commanders for the incident types they will be required to lead; and properly resource regular, practical training for all levels of operational managers and firefighters in the application of appropriate Incident Command procedures.

7.  That HFRS secure the comprehensive Junior Officer courses available at the Fire Service College for all operational Crew Managers and Watch Managers.

8.  That HFRS ensure that the Service Monitoring procedure SIS OPS 2/070 – that requires the attendance of a Supervisory Officer to ‘MONITOR’ fire service personnel at an incident in respect of their operational performance so that any weaknesses identified can be included in any training needs analysis - is adhered to and management structures sufficiently resourced. This to include the monitoring of Incident Command performance.

9. That HFRS review and properly resource all operational training to ensure that all RDS and Wholetime firefighting personnel receive regular training to ensure that they are competent to:

  • Understand the burning characteristics, development and behaviour of compartment fires;
  • Recognise and assess the risks involved when dealing with compartment fires;
  • Prevent flashover and backdraught or mitigate their effects where possible;
  • Implement control measures to protect themselves from the effects of fire;
  • Recognise the operating limitations of Firefighters’ Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and firefighting ancillary equipment;
  • Control and extinguish fires with minimum risk to their own and others’ safety;
  • Understand the principals of Incident Command;
  • Recognise and understand the appropriate application of offensive and defensive Firefighting;
  • Apply appropriate offensive and defensive fire-attack techniques;
  • Implement appropriately revised and updated High Rise Incident procedures;
  • Implement appropriately revised BA procedures consistent with HMI technical bulletin 1/97.

Accident Investigation Protocol

That HFRS and FBU jointly review SIS note H&S 1/008 ‘Reporting and Investigation of Accidents and Incidents’ in particular Section 1 ‘All Accidents-Reporting and Recording’; and should also ensure that the Safety representatives are informed of all accidents immediately; and Section 4 ‘Disclosure of information’ is expanded to include either a protocol for a joint investigation, or a protocol that protects the safety representatives rights to full disclosure, access to documents, the provision of information/evidence, and the right to have private discussions with employees.

Further information hoping to be identified and still to be located.

--end--

IFE Commentary & lessons if applicable

None produced at this time.

Known available source documents

Further information hoping to be identified and still to be located.

FRS Incident Report/s

Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service (HFRS). (circa 2005). Investigation into the deaths of Firefighter Jeffrey Wornham, Firefighter Michael Miller and Ms Natalie Close at 85 Harrow Court, Silam Road, Stevenage, Hertfordshire on Wednesday 2nd February 2005, call number 1693. [pdf]. Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service.

FBU Incident Report/s:

The Fire Brigades Union (FBU). (circa 2005). Fire Brigades Union Region 9 Health and Safety Investigation at 85 Harrow Court, Silam Road, Stevenage, Hertfordshire. [pdf]. Fire Brigades Union.   

The Fire Brigades Union (FBU). (circa 2005). Region 9 Fire Brigades Union executive summary from the FBU Health and Safety report concerning the fatal fire at 85 Harrow Court, Silam Road, Stevenage, Hertfordshire. [pdf]. Fire Brigades Union. 

Grimwood, P. (2005). The fire at 85 Harrow Court, Stevenage, 2nd February 2005. A report on strategic and tactical response issues and the rapid fire development during the early stages of the fire. [pdf] Fire Brigades Union.

Grimwood, P. (2005). Harrow Court Initial Report; The Hazards of Firefighting in Residential Tower Blocks. [pdf]. Fire Brigades Union.

FBU DVD information

Health & Safety Executive (HSE) Incident Report/s and/or improvement notices

No information identified to date and/or still to be located.

Hertfordshire Constabulary Incident Report/s

No information identified to date and/or still to be located.

East of England Ambulance Service Incident Report

No information identified to date and/or still to be located.

Building Research Establishment (BRE) Reports/investigations/research

BRE Global. (Circa. 2015). A series of experiments to assess the effect of fire on a selection of electrical cable supports and fixings. [online]. Available here. https://www.bre.co.uk/page.jsp?id=3652 [Accessed 5th January 2018]. BRE Global.

Holland, C., Shipp, M. and Crowder, D. (Circa. 2015). A series of experiments to assess the effect of fire on a selection of electrical cable supports and fixings. [pdf]. Available here. BRE Global.

Further information hoping to be identified and still to be located.

Coroner’s report/s and/or regulation 28 notices

No information identified to date and/or still to be located.

Other information sources

No information identified to date and/or still to be located.

Service learning material

HFRS have created a training DVD. LINK.

Videos available

No information identified to date and/or still to be located.

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